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Prices versus Quantities in Fisheries Models: Comment

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  • Lars Gårn Hansen

Abstract

Jensen and Vestergaard (2003) compare price regulation with quantity regulation under economic uncertainty in the spirit of Weitzman (1974). For a schooling fishery without search cost, they find that price regulation is preferred over quantity regulation, when demand for fish is elastic. However, this finding is based on an assumption that does not hold and, in fact; quantity regulation is always preferred for this type of fishery, irrespective of the demand elasticity. In this note, we show that a pro quota result always applies for a schooling fishery without search costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars Gårn Hansen, 2008. "Prices versus Quantities in Fisheries Models: Comment," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(4), pages 708-711.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:84:y:2008:i:4:p:708-711
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2003. "Prices versus Quantities in Fisheries Models," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(3), pages 415-425.
    2. Martin L. Weitzman, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(4), pages 477-491.
    3. Neher,Philip A., 1990. "Natural Resource Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521311748.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lars Gårn Hansen, 2012. "Regulating Renewable Resources under Uncertainty," IFRO Working Paper 2012/3, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    2. Vincent Martinet & Michel de Lara & Julio Peña-Torres & Héctor Ramírez Cabrera, 2012. "Risk and Sustainability: Assessing Fisheries Management Strategies," Working Papers hal-04141121, HAL.
    3. Christian Elleby & Frank Jensen, 2018. "How Many Instruments Do We Really Need? A First-Best Optimal Solution to Multiple Objectives with Fisheries Regulation," IFRO Working Paper 2018/05, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    4. Frank Jensen & Lars Gårn Hansen, 2017. "The welfare gain from switching to tax regulation of fisheries," IFRO Working Paper 2017/07, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    5. Vincent Martinet & Julio Peña-Torres & Michel Lara & Hector Ramírez C., 2016. "Risk and Sustainability: Assessing Fishery Management Strategies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(4), pages 683-707, August.
    6. Hansen, Lars Gårn & Jensen, Frank & Russell, Clifford, 2013. "Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 135-147.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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