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When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance

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  • Zev J. Eigen

Abstract

This article reports the results of an online experiment that suggest that individuals are more likely to comply with contracts they participated in negotiating (even marginally) than with ones they did not and that preconsent notice of a contract term increases the likelihood of compliance with that term. The experiment also measures the relative effectiveness of four framings (legal, moral, social, and instrumental) of requests to continue to perform an undesirable task/contract term, as compared to a generic request in the absence of a contract. The moral framing was the most effective at inducing performance. A positivistic legal framing (absent monetary sanctions) was significantly less effective than were other framings and only marginally less so than was a generic request to continue performing the task in the absence of a contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Zev J. Eigen, 2012. "When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 67-93.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/664688
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/664688
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bhattacharjee, Sudip & Gopal, Ram D & Lertwachara, Kaveepan & Marsden, James R, 2006. "Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 91-114, April.
    2. Craswell, Richard, 1988. "Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 401-436, June.
    3. Yannis Bakos & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, 2009. "Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts," Working Papers 09-04, NET Institute, revised Aug 2009.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel & André Schmelzer, 2017. "Committing the English and the Continental Way – An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_16, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. repec:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:161-178 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017. "Promises and expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 161-178.
    4. Kirsten Martin, 2016. "Do Privacy Notices Matter? Comparing the Impact of Violating Formal Privacy Notices and Informal Privacy Norms on Consumer Trust Online," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(S2), pages 191-215.
    5. Dodonova, Anna & Khoroshilov, Yuri, 2014. "Compensation and performance: An experimental study," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 304-307.

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