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Quality and the Commons: The Surf Gangs of California

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  • Daniel T. Kaffine

Abstract

In open-access settings, high-quality resources are lucrative, yet fencing out potential entrants may be very costly. I examine the endogenous creation of property rights, focusing on the incentives that resource quality provides to close the commons. Analytical examples explore the incentives of locals to increase or decrease the strength of property rights conditional on how locals and nonlocals value the quality of the resource. The empirical analysis looks at a unique resource-surf breaks-and estimates the relationship between the exogenous quality of the resource (waves at the surf break) and local attempts to seize the common surf break. Using cross-sectional data on 86 surf breaks along the southern California coast, this paper finds that a 10 percent increase in quality leads to a 7-17 percent increase in the strength of property rights. (c) 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

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  • Daniel T. Kaffine, 2009. "Quality and the Commons: The Surf Gangs of California," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 727-743, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:52:y:2009:i:4:p:727-743
    DOI: 10.1086/605293
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
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    1. Property Rights, Snow, and Parking
      by Josh Wright in Truth on the Market on 2010-12-31 09:38:33

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    Cited by:

    1. Franklin G. Mixon & Chandini Sankaran, 2019. "Men in Grey Suits: Shark Activity and Congestion of the Surfing Commons," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(11), pages 1-15, June.
    2. Martin Rode, 2022. "The institutional foundations of surf break governance in Atlantic Europe," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 175-204, January.
    3. Gourley, Patrick & Madonia, Greg, 2018. "Resource booms and crime: Evidence from oil and gas production in Colorado," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 37-52.
    4. Franklin G. Mixon, 2018. "Camaraderie, common pool congestion, and the optimal size of surf gangs," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 381-396, November.
    5. Hughes, Jonathan E. & Kaffine, Daniel, 2017. "When is increasing consumption of common property optimal? Sorting, congestion and entry in the commons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 227-242.
    6. Chávez, Carlos A. & Murphy, James J. & Quezada, Felipe J. & Stranlund, John K., 2023. "The endogenous formation of common pool resource coalitions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 82-102.
    7. Franklin G. Mixon & Steven B. Caudill, 2018. "Guarding giants: resource commons quality and informal property rights in big-wave surfing," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 1697-1715, June.
    8. Thomas McGregor & Samuel Wills, 2016. "Surfing A Wave Of Economic Growth," OxCarre Working Papers 170, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    9. Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad & Richter, Andries, 2019. "Tragedy, property rights, and the commons: investigating the causal relationship from institutions to ecosystem collapse," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90606, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Jonathan E. Hughes & Daniel Kaffine, 2013. "When is Encouraging Consumption of Common Property Second Best? Sorting, Congestion and Entry in the Commons," Working Papers 2013-05, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business.
    11. Leonard, Bryan & Parker, Dominic P. & Anderson, Terry L., 2020. "Land quality, land rights, and indigenous poverty," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    12. McGregor, Thomas & Wills, Samuel, 2016. "Natural Assets: Surfing a Wave of Economic Growth," Working Papers 2016-06, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    13. Franklin Mixon, 2014. "Bad vibrations: new evidence on commons quality and localism at California’s surf breaks," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(4), pages 379-397, December.
    14. Ponting, Jess & O’Brien, Danny, 2015. "Regulating “Nirvana”: Sustainable surf tourism in a climate of increasing regulation," Sport Management Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 99-110.
    15. Claudia R. Williamson & Carrie B. Kerekes, 2011. "Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal Institutions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 537-572.

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