The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts
This study analyzes the impact of corporate governance structures at the initial public offering (IPO) date. We test hypotheses that firms with more shareholder-oriented governance structures receive higher valuations at the IPO stage and have better long-term performance. Our sample is a set of 107 IPOs of real estate investment trusts (REITs) between 1991 and 1998. Using a single industry and REITs in particular reduces potentially confounding effects due to differences in risk, transparency, and growth potential. We believe this-combined with our use of IPOs-mitigates the endogeneity problem present in studies of the impact of governance on seasoned firms' valuation. Our analysis indicates that firms with stronger governance structures have higher IPO valuations and better long-term operating performance than their peers. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:51:y:2008:i:3:p:539-562. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.