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Aide Au Développement Et Information Asymétrique : Une Analyse Principal-Agent

  • Maher GORDAH

    ()

    (Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis, GREDEG UMR CNRS)

  • Thomas LE TEXIER

    ()

    (Université de Rennes 1, CREM UMR CNRS)

In recent years some critiques toward the efficiency of foreign aid have appeared in the economic literature. The allocation of foreign aid toward corrupt governments induces the failure of development policies. Donors have to control the use of aid in order to avoid the risk of kleptocracy. Our work is based on the role of the principal-agent model as a tool to analyze the allocating of foreign aid. We use the principal-agent model to formalize the problem of aid efficiency. We find that foreign aid allocation without any coordination between donors induces inefficiency in the setting out of development policies.

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File URL: http://region-developpement.univ-tln.fr/fr/pdf/R34/9-GordahLeTexier.pdf
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Article provided by Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var in its journal Région et Développement.

Volume (Year): 34 (2011)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 163-180

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Handle: RePEc:tou:journl:v:34:y:2011:p:163-180
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  1. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, June.
  2. Svensson, Jakob, 1997. "When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? - Aid Dependence and Conditionality," Seminar Papers 600, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  3. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. " Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
  4. Martens,Bertin & Mummert,Uwe & Murrell,Peter & Seabright,Paul, 2002. "The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808187.
  5. Alesina, Alberto & Weder, Beatrice, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," Scholarly Articles 4553011, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  6. Azam, Jean-Paul & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Contracting for aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-58, February.
  7. Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April.
  8. Christiaensen, Luc & Scott, Christopher & Wodon, Quentin, 2002. "Development Targets and Costs," MPRA Paper 12299, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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