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Aide Au Développement Et Information Asymétrique : Une Analyse Principal-Agent

Author

Listed:
  • Maher GORDAH

    () (Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis, GREDEG UMR CNRS)

  • Thomas LE TEXIER

    () (Université de Rennes 1, CREM UMR CNRS)

Abstract

In recent years some critiques toward the efficiency of foreign aid have appeared in the economic literature. The allocation of foreign aid toward corrupt governments induces the failure of development policies. Donors have to control the use of aid in order to avoid the risk of kleptocracy. Our work is based on the role of the principal-agent model as a tool to analyze the allocating of foreign aid. We use the principal-agent model to formalize the problem of aid efficiency. We find that foreign aid allocation without any coordination between donors induces inefficiency in the setting out of development policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Maher GORDAH & Thomas LE TEXIER, 2011. "Aide Au Développement Et Information Asymétrique : Une Analyse Principal-Agent," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 34, pages 163-180.
  • Handle: RePEc:tou:journl:v:34:y:2011:p:163-180
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    File URL: http://region-developpement.univ-tln.fr/fr/pdf/R34/9-GordahLeTexier.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, January.
    2. Martens,Bertin & Mummert,Uwe & Murrell,Peter & Seabright,Paul, 2008. "The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521055390, May.
    3. Azam, Jean-Paul & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Contracting for aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-58, February.
    4. Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April.
    5. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    6. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
    7. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.
    8. Christiaensen, Luc & Scott, Christopher & Wodon, Quentin, 2002. "Development Targets and Costs," MPRA Paper 12299, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Fares, M’hand, 2005. "Quels fondements à l’incomplétude des contrats?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 81(3), pages 535-555, Septembre.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    INFORMATION ASYMÉTRIQUE; DÉVELOPPEMENT; AIDE; PRINCIPAL-AGENT;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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