Aide Au Développement Et Information Asymétrique : Une Analyse Principal-Agent
In recent years some critiques toward the efficiency of foreign aid have appeared in the economic literature. The allocation of foreign aid toward corrupt governments induces the failure of development policies. Donors have to control the use of aid in order to avoid the risk of kleptocracy. Our work is based on the role of the principal-agent model as a tool to analyze the allocating of foreign aid. We use the principal-agent model to formalize the problem of aid efficiency. We find that foreign aid allocation without any coordination between donors induces inefficiency in the setting out of development policies.
Volume (Year): 34 (2011)
Issue (Month): ()
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