Aide Au Développement Et Information Asymétrique : Une Analyse Principal-Agent
In recent years some critiques toward the efficiency of foreign aid have appeared in the economic literature. The allocation of foreign aid toward corrupt governments induces the failure of development policies. Donors have to control the use of aid in order to avoid the risk of kleptocracy. Our work is based on the role of the principal-agent model as a tool to analyze the allocating of foreign aid. We use the principal-agent model to formalize the problem of aid efficiency. We find that foreign aid allocation without any coordination between donors induces inefficiency in the setting out of development policies.
Volume (Year): 34 (2011)
Issue (Month): ()
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- Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005.
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, July.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 2005. "Contract theory," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9543, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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- Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
- Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 1999. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," NBER Working Papers 7108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, Alberto & Weder, Beatrice, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," Scholarly Articles 4553011, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.
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- Svensson, Jakob, 1997. "When is foreign aid policy credible : aid dependence and conditionality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1740, The World Bank.
- Svensson, Jakob, 1997. "When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? - Aid Dependence and Conditionality," Seminar Papers 600, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Fares, M’hand, 2005. "Quels fondements à l’incomplétude des contrats?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 81(3), pages 535-555, Septembre.
- Christiaensen, Luc & Scott, Christopher & Wodon, Quentin, 2002. "Development Targets and Costs," MPRA Paper 12299, University Library of Munich, Germany. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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