European Integration and Market Structure in the Soft Drinks Industry
The focus of this paper is the impact of European integration in the soft drinks industry. It is shown that the geographic level at which competition takes place has moved from the national to the European stage. We apply the new theory of industrial structure where the essential notion is that in endogenous sunk cost industries such as soft drinks, the traditional inverse structure-size relation may break down, due to the escalation of overhead fixed expenditures. The evidence is consistent with the theory. Moreover, it is shown how the persistence of a first mover advantage may affect market concentration. Finally, and in response to exogenous structural change, significant restructuring and increased multinationality has been observed among the leading manufacturers.
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Volume (Year): 9 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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