IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/euract/v26y2017i3p503-530.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Impact of Taxes on Competition for CEOs

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Krenn

Abstract

This paper contributes to the question of how taxation of corporate profits and wages affects competition among firms for highly skilled human resources such as CEOs. Use of a theoretical model shows that wage taxes can have a substantial impact on the outcome of such a competition if marginal tax rates are different as in an international labor market. Further, the paper shows that increasing the wage tax rate unilaterally can have an ambiguous effect on observed gross compensation levels. However, in a local labor market for CEOs, observed gross fixed salaries should decline in the wage tax rate. Tax effects in a market for CEOs is a particularly interesting topic because recent developments with respect to compensation practices of top-level managers have opened a public debate about the use of instruments for regulating compensation of those managers. Furthermore, many countries around the world use tax incentives in order to facilitate immigration of highly skilled human resources. The investigation follows an analytical economics-based approach by extending an LEN model with elements of competition for scarce human resources and income taxation. It investigates the impact of differential taxation on the competition between two firms for the exclusive service of a unique, highly skilled CEO.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Krenn, 2017. "The Impact of Taxes on Competition for CEOs," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(3), pages 503-530, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:euract:v:26:y:2017:i:3:p:503-530
    DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2016.1200477
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09638180.2016.1200477
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/09638180.2016.1200477?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716.
    2. Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, 2010. "Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936--2005," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(5), pages 2099-2138.
    3. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2008. "Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(1), pages 49-100.
    4. Rainer Niemann, 2008. "The Effects of Differential Taxation on Managerial Effort and Risk Taking," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 64(3), pages 273-310, September.
    5. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    6. Frydman, Carola & Molloy, Raven S., 2011. "Does tax policy affect executive compensation? Evidence from postwar tax reforms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1425-1437.
    7. Peter Katuscák, 2009. "Taxes and Executive Compensation: Evidence from the 1990s," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 55(3-4), pages 542-568.
    8. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Camille Landais & Esben Schultz, 2014. "Migration and Wage Effects of Taxing Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigners' Tax Scheme in Denmark," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 129(1), pages 333-378.
    9. van Veen, Kees & Marsman, Ilse, 2008. "How international are executive boards of European MNCs? Nationality diversity in 15 European countries," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 188-198, June.
    10. J�rg-Markus Hitz & Stephanie M�ller-Bloch, 2015. "Market Reactions to the Regulation of Executive Compensation," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 659-684, December.
    11. Deepak K. Datta & James P. Guthrie, 1994. "Executive succession: Organizational antecedents of ceo characteristics," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(7), pages 569-577, September.
    12. Kevin J. Murphy & Ján Zábojník, 2004. "CEO Pay and Appointments: A Market-Based Explanation for Recent Trends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 192-196, May.
    13. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Camille Landais & Emmanuel Saez, 2013. "Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1892-1924, August.
    14. repec:oup:qjecon:v:129:y:2013:i:1:p:333-378 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Bauer & Thomas Kourouxous & Peter Krenn, 2018. "Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 11(1), pages 33-76, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Krenn, Peter, 2015. "The impact of taxes on competition for CEOs," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 190, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    2. Thomas Bauer & Thomas Kourouxous & Peter Krenn, 2018. "Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 11(1), pages 33-76, February.
    3. Frydman, Carola & Papanikolaou, Dimitris, 2018. "In search of ideas: Technological innovation and executive pay inequality," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 1-24.
    4. Shue, Kelly & Townsend, Richard R., 2017. "Growth through rigidity: An explanation for the rise in CEO pay," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 1-21.
    5. Kelly Shue & Richard Townsend, 2016. "Growth through Rigidity: An Explanation for the Rise in CEO Pay," NBER Working Papers 21975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2014. "Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective," Cahiers de recherche 1406, CIRPEE.
    7. Ross Levine & Chen Lin & Zigan Wang, 2018. "Pollution and Human Capital Migration: Evidence from Corporate Executives," NBER Working Papers 24389, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2014. "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 230-271, February.
    9. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
    10. Aivazian, Varouj A. & Lai, Tat-kei & Rahaman, Mohammad M., 2013. "The market for CEOs: An empirical analysis," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 24-54.
    11. Frydman, Carola & Molloy, Raven S., 2011. "Does tax policy affect executive compensation? Evidence from postwar tax reforms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1425-1437.
    12. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2013. "The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55405, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Frydman, Carola & Molloy, Raven, 2012. "Pay Cuts for the Boss: Executive Compensation in the 1940s," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(1), pages 225-251, March.
    14. Stanimir Morfov & Manuel Santos, 2017. "A Model of Managerial Talent: Addressing Some Puzzles in CEO Compensation," Working Papers 2017-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    15. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, "undated". "The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options," FMG Discussion Papers dp713, Financial Markets Group.
    16. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier & Julien Sauvagnat, 2014. "CEO Pay and Firm Size: An Update After the Crisis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(574), pages 40-59, February.
    17. Voßmerbäumer, Jan, 2012. "Effizienzwirkungen einer Regulierung von Managergehältern durch das Steuerrecht," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 125, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    18. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    19. C, Loran & Eckbo, Espen & Lu, Ching-Chih, 2014. "Does Executive Compensation Reflect Default Risk?," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2014/11, University of Stavanger.
    20. Cziraki, Peter & Jenter, Dirk, 2021. "The Market for CEOs," CEPR Discussion Papers 16281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:euract:v:26:y:2017:i:3:p:503-530. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/REAR20 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/REAR20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.