Competition and Private School Vouchers
This paper examines the theoretical presumption that private school vouchers will increase the quality of education in public and private schools. Even in simple models that assume public education is plagued by X-inefficiency or budger-maximizing administrators, the effect of vouchers on quality are ambiguous. The primary reason for the ambiguity is that vouchers may reduce the enrollment response to changes in public-school quality by placing different households at the margin of deciding between public and private education. The ambiguity also stems from situations where public cost-cutting responses completely dominate quality responses and where private-school quality falls.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 5 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/CEDE20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CEDE20|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:edecon:v:5:y:1997:i:3:p:245-263. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Chris Longhurst)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.