Transparent US monetary policy: theory and tests
In 1994, the Federal Reserve System moved to a more transparent reporting of monetary policy. This article assesses the impact of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty about future monetary policy using T-bill rate forecast dispersions and ex post forecast errors from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as a proxy for monetary policy uncertainty. The empirical findings confirm that Federal Reserve transparency has reduced the uncertainty about future monetary policy.
Volume (Year): 44 (2012)
Issue (Month): 7 (March)
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