Employee-owned and capitalist firms: is performance linked to ownership?
This paper does a comparative analysis of the economic performance between employee-owned firms (EOFs) and conventional capitalist companies (non-employee-owned firms, NEOFs). EOFs show good economic performance if the different objectives that distinguish them from NEOFs are considered. These differences stem precisely from the different capital-ownership structures. Nevertheless, the results deteriorate if profitability and productiveness are analysed. The results for productivity differ from theoretical thought which considers that the main differences between these two types of structures should be explained by the double condition people have as both partners and workers in the EOF; this link between company and workers should translate into increased productiveness. The results of the analysis do not empirically demonstrate the positive effects that were expected with an EOF structure. There are, however, sufficient motives for extending the study to the compared analysis of other subjects that work under specific legal regulations and even to the compared analysis of other regulative forms that exist in other Member States of the European Union. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
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Volume (Year): 8 (2014)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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