Lorenz Dominance and Non-welfaristic Redistribution
Given the decision to implement a non-welfaristic redistribution scheme, we analyze which mechanisms are favored by traditional Lorenz dominance and poverty dominance adherents. We show that for large classes of income functions Lorenz dominance results can be found in the comparison of two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms. Comparisons of different conditionally egalitarian mechanisms only yield poverty dominance results. Finally, certain egalitarian equivalent mechanisms can Lorenz dominate all conditionally egalitarian mechanisms. Our analysis stresses the need for accurate empirical estimates of the pre-tax income function and of the distributions of responsibility and compensation characteristics.
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Volume (Year): 28 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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