Are real options more valuable in the presence of agency conflicts?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
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KeywordsReal option; Agency conflict; Delegation; D86;
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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