Are real options more valuable in the presence of agency conflicts?
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Volume (Year): 1 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Antle, Rick & Bogetoft, Peter & Stark, Andrew W., 2001. "Incentive Problems and Investment Timing Options," Unit of Economics Working papers 24192, Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Food and Resource Economic Institute.
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
- Gunther Friedl, 2002. "Sequential Investment And Time To Build," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 54(1), pages 56-79, January.
- Sunil Dutta & Stefan Reichelstein, 1999. "Performance Measurement in Multi-Period Agencies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 158-, March.
- Henry, Claude, 1974. "Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The "Irreversibility Effect."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 1006-12, December.
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