The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers
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- Martin Gregor & Lenka Š astná, 2011. "The Decentralization Tradeoff for Complementary Spillovers," Working Papers IES 2011/13, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Apr 2011.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
KeywordsSpillover; Spill-in; Complementarity; Decentralization theorem; Externality; H41; H73; H77;
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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