Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
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- Cécile Aubert & Jerôme Pouyet, 2004. "Incomplete Regulation, Market Competition and Collusion," Working Papers 2004-39, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Cécile Aubert & Jérôme Pouyet, 2006. "Incomplete Regulation, Market Competition and Collusion," Post-Print hal-00151744, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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- R. Gary-Bobo & Y. Spiegel, 2003. "Optimal state-contingent regulation under limited liability," THEMA Working Papers 2003-09, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Caillaud, Bernard, 1990. "Regulation, competition, and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 87-110, October.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
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- Lucia Quesada, 2005. "Collusion as an Informed Principal Problem," Game Theory and Information 0504002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Aubert, Cécile & Falck, Oliver & Heblich, Stephan, .
"Subsidizing National Champions: An Evolutionary Perspective,"
Chapters in Economics,
University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Cécile Aubert & Oliver Falck & Stephan Heblich, 2008. "Subsidizing National Champions: An Evolutionary Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 2380, CESifo Group Munich.
- Cécile Aubert & Oliver Falck & Stephan Heblich, 2011. "Subsidizing National Champions: An Evolutionary Perspective," Post-Print hal-00382740, HAL.
- Sara Biancini, 2010.
"Incomplete Regulation, Competition, and Entry in Increasing Returns to Scale Industries,"
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- Sara Biancini, 2010. "Incomplete Regulation, Competition and Entry in Increasing Returns to Scale Industries," Post-Print halshs-01103804, HAL.
- Marco Meireles & Paula Sarmento, 2009. "Incomplete Regulation, Asymmetric Information and Collusion-Proofness," FEP Working Papers 320, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Angela S. Bergantino & Etienne Billette De Villemeur & Annalisa Vinella, 2011.
"Partial Regulation in Vertically Differentiated Industries,"
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- Raffaele Fiocco & Dongyu Guo, 2015.
"Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains,"
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- Fiocco, Raffaele & Guo, Dongyu, 2014. "Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 464, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/4072 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsIncomplete regulation; Collusion; Market competition; Incentives; L41; L51;
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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