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Pricing and entry in regulated industries: The role of regulatory design

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  • De Fraja, Gianni

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  • De Fraja, Gianni, 1997. "Pricing and entry in regulated industries: The role of regulatory design," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 259-278, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:64:y:1997:i:2:p:259-278
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gianni De Fraja, "undated". "Entry, Pricing and Incentives: The Role of Regulatory Commitment," Discussion Papers 94/29, Department of Economics, University of York.
    2. Xavier Freixas & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 173-191.
    3. Caillaud, Bernard, 1990. "Regulation, competition, and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 87-110, October.
    4. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, January.
    5. Dana, James Jr. & Spier, Kathryn E., 1994. "Designing a private industry : Government auctions with endogenous market structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 127-147.
    6. McGuire, Thomas G. & Riordan, Michael H., 1995. "Incomplete information and optimal market structure public purchases from private providers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 125-141.
    7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
    8. McGuire, Thomas G. & Riordan, Michael H., 1995. "Incomplete information and optimal market structure public purchases from private providers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 125-141.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paula Sarmento & António Brandão, 2008. "Regulatory design under asymmetric information about demand," CEF.UP Working Papers 0802, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    2. Anton, James J. & Vander Weide, James H. & Vettas, Nikolaos, 2002. "Entry auctions and strategic behavior under cross-market price constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 611-629, May.
    3. Debande, Olivier, 2001. "Deregulating and privatizing statutory monopolies," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 111-137.

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