First-price auctions where one of the bidders’ valuations is common knowledge
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Volume (Year): 10 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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- Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-42, February.
- Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September.
- Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Shmuel Zamir, 2001.
"First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 461-480.
- Michael Landsberger & Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Shmuel Zamir, 1999. "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge," Working Papers 99-18, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- M. Landsberger & J. Rubinstein & E. Wolfstetter & S. Zamir, 1996. "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1996,36, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Estelle Cantillon, 2000.
"The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1279, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Cantillon, Estelle, 2008. "The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-25, January.
- Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9001, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
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