Protests and reputation
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- Buenrostro, Lucia & Dhillon, Amrita & Wooders, Myrna, 2006. "Protests and Reputation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 751, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Lucia Buenrostro & Amrita Dhillon & Myrna H. Wooders, 2006. "Protests and Reputation," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0615, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
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"Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective,"
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- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
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- Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Roland Hodler & Dominic Rohner, 2012. "Electoral terms and terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 181-193, January.
- Mehdi Shadmehr & Peter Haschke, 2016. "Youth, Revolution, And Repression," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 778-793, April.
- Shadmehr, Mehdi, 2015. "Extremism in revolutionary movements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 97-121.
More about this item
- F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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