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Agent based model of a simple economy

  • Vladimír Gazda
  • Marek Gróf

    ()

  • Július Horváth
  • Matúš Kubák
  • Tomáš Rosival

This article proposes a model of a simple economy based on a set of agent-based modeling principles. The model is based on the “trust game” formulated by Berg et al. (Games Econ Behav 10:122–142, 1995 ), and anticipates a random matching of partners taking in to account adaptive agent behavior. Simulation in the NetLogo programming environment, using profile distributions obtained from empirical studies, has shown the most successful agents to posses low parameters of trust in the role of Sender and high parameters of trustworthiness in the role of Receiver. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11403-012-0097-2
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination.

Volume (Year): 7 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 209-221

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:7:y:2012:i:2:p:209-221
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11403

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  1. Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels & Peter Werner, 2007. "The Dynamic Interplay of Inequality and Trust – An Experimental Study," CESifo Working Paper Series 2173, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Ananish Chaudhuri & Lata Gangadharan, 2007. "An Experimental Analysis of Trust and Trustworthiness," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 959–985, April.
  3. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  4. James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, 2006. "When are Women More Generous than Men?," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-07, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  5. Chaim Fershtman & Uri Gneezy, 2001. "Discrimination In A Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 351-377, February.
  6. Dirk Engelmann & Urs Fischbacher, . "Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game," IEW - Working Papers 132, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  7. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, . "Trust, Communication and Contracts: An Experiment," Working Papers 0206, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
  8. Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000. "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 811-846, August.
    • Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000. "Measuring Trust," Scholarly Articles 4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Giorgio Coricelli & Luis González Morales & Amelie Mahlstedt, 2006. "The Investment Game With Asymmetric Information," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 13-30, 02.
  10. Willinger, Marc & Keser, Claudia & Lohmann, Christopher & Usunier, Jean-Claude, 2003. "A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-466, August.
  11. Fiona Greig & Iris Bohnet, 2008. "Is There Reciprocity In A Reciprocal-Exchange Economy? Evidence Of Gendered Norms From A Slum In Nairobi, Kenya," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(1), pages 77-83, 01.
  12. Di Cagno, Daniela & Sciubba, Emanuela, 2010. "Trust, trustworthiness and social networks: Playing a trust game when networks are formed in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 156-167, August.
  13. Cochard, Francois & Nguyen Van, Phu & Willinger, Marc, 2004. "Trusting behavior in a repeated investment game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 31-44, September.
  14. Stanton, Angela A., 2007. "Neural Substrates of Decision-Making in Economic Games," MPRA Paper 4030, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jun 2007.
  15. Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February.
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