Agent based model of a simple economy
This article proposes a model of a simple economy based on a set of agent-based modeling principles. The model is based on the “trust game” formulated by Berg et al. (Games Econ Behav 10:122–142, 1995 ), and anticipates a random matching of partners taking in to account adaptive agent behavior. Simulation in the NetLogo programming environment, using profile distributions obtained from empirical studies, has shown the most successful agents to posses low parameters of trust in the role of Sender and high parameters of trustworthiness in the role of Receiver. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 7 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11403/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dirk Engelmann & Urs Fischbacher, "undated".
"Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game,"
IEW - Working Papers
132, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Engelmann, Dirk & Fischbacher, Urs, 2009. "Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 399-407, November.
- Dirk Engelmann & Urs Fischbacher, 2008. "Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game," TWI Research Paper Series 34, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universitï¿½t Konstanz.
- Dirk Engelmann & Urs Fischbacher, 2003. "Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp215, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000.
4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels & Peter Werner, 2007.
"The Dynamic Interplay of Inequality and Trust - An Experimental Study,"
Working Paper Series in Economics
37, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
- Greiner, Ben & Ockenfels, Axel & Werner, Peter, 2012. "The dynamic interplay of inequality and trust—An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 355-365.
- Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels & Peter Werner, 2007. "The Dynamic Interplay of Inequality and Trust – An Experimental Study," CESifo Working Paper Series 2173, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels & Peter Werner, 2007. "The Dynamic Interplay of Inequality and Trust - An Experimental Study," Harvard Business School Working Papers 08-026, Harvard Business School.
- Di Cagno, Daniela & Sciubba, Emanuela, 2010. "Trust, trustworthiness and social networks: Playing a trust game when networks are formed in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 156-167, August.
- James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, 2006.
"When are Women More Generous than Men?,"
Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series
2006-07, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, "undated".
"Trust, Communication and Contracts: An Experiment,"
0206, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
- Ananish Chaudhuri & Lata Gangadharan, 2007. "An Experimental Analysis of Trust and Trustworthiness," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 959-985, April.
- Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February.
- Willinger, Marc & Keser, Claudia & Lohmann, Christopher & Usunier, Jean-Claude, 2003. "A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-466, August.
- Chaim Fershtman & Uri Gneezy, 2001. "Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(1), pages 351-377.
- Fiona Greig & Iris Bohnet, 2008. "Is There Reciprocity In A Reciprocal-Exchange Economy? Evidence Of Gendered Norms From A Slum In Nairobi, Kenya," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(1), pages 77-83, 01.
- Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
- François Cochard & Phu Nguyen Van & Marc Willinger, 2004.
"Trusting Behavior in a Repeated Investment Game,"
- Stanton, Angela A., 2007. "Neural Substrates of Decision-Making in Economic Games," MPRA Paper 4030, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jun 2007.
- G. Coricelli & L.G. Morales & A. Mahlstedt, "undated".
"The investment game with asymmetric information,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2003-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:7:y:2012:i:2:p:209-221. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.