Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager: physician interaction
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DOI: 10.1007/s10198-010-0255-1
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- D. Crainich & H. Leleu & A. Mauléon, 2011. "Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager physician interaction," Post-Print hal-00657024, HAL.
- D. Crainich & H. Leleu & A. Mauleon, 2006. "Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager - physician interaction," Post-Print hal-00259566, HAL.
- CRAINICH, David & LELEU, Hervé & MAULEON, Ana, 2006. "Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager-physician interaction," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- D. Crainich & H. Leleu & A. Mauleon, 2006. "Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager-physician interaction," Post-Print hal-00246210, HAL.
- CRAINICH, David & LELEU, Hervé & MAULEON, Ana, 2011. "Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager: physician interaction," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2323, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
References listed on IDEAS
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- D. Crainich & H. Leleu & A. Mauleon, 2006. "The optimality of hospital financing system: the role of physician-manager interactions," Post-Print hal-00259585, HAL.
- D. Crainich & H. Leleu & A. Mauleon, 2006. "The optimality of hospital financing system: the role of physician-manager interactions," Post-Print hal-00259581, HAL.
- H. Leleu & D. Crainich & A. Mauleon, 2006. "The optimality of hospital financing system: the role of physician-manager interactions," Post-Print hal-00204745, HAL.
- D. Crainich & H. Leleu & A. Mauleon, 2006. "The optimality of hospital financing system: the role of physician-manager interactions," Post-Print hal-00246117, HAL.
- CRAINICH, David & LELEU, Hervé & MAULEON, Ana, 2006. "The optimality of hospital financing system: the role of physician-manager interactions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- H. Leleu & D. Crainich & A. Mauleon, 2006. "The optimality of hospital financing system: the role of physician-manager interactions," Post-Print hal-00289058, HAL.
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- Takahara, Tsuyoshi, 2022. "Quality competition, location choice, and ownership conversion in the healthcare market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
- Alex Barrachina & Víctor González-Chordá, 2016. "To report or not to report: Applying game theory to nursing error reporting," Working Papers 2016/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
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More about this item
Keywords
Hospital’s financing system; Strategic interaction; Activity-based payment system; I1; D4; D2;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
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