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Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager physician interaction

Author

Listed:
  • D. Crainich

    (LEM - Lille - Economie et Management - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • H. Leleu

    (LEM - Lille - Economie et Management - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • A. Mauléon

Abstract

Hospital financing systems determine ma jor decisions made by physicians and managers within hospitals. This paper examines the impact of the transition toward an activity-based reimburse- ment system that has emerged in most OCDE countries. We consider two initial situations, one for a private for-profit sector where both hospitals and physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and the other for a public sector under prospective budget and salaried physicians. For the private sector, our model focuses on the type of interaction (simultaneous, sequential or joint decision-making games) that should emerge between agents after the introduction of the activity-based financing system. In the public sector, the elasticity of the demand to the level of inputs seems to play a more crucial role in the transition.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • D. Crainich & H. Leleu & A. Mauléon, 2011. "Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager physician interaction," Post-Print hal-00657024, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00657024
    DOI: 10.1007/s10198-010-0255-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Takahara, Tsuyoshi, 2022. "Quality competition, location choice, and ownership conversion in the healthcare market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    2. Alex Barrachina & Víctor González-Chordá, 2016. "To report or not to report: Applying game theory to nursing error reporting," Working Papers 2016/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations

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