Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6
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More about this item
Keywords
Market design; School choice; Consistency; Weak consistency; EADAM;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
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