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Analyzing concentration in the Greek public procurement market: a network theory approach

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  • Andreas Christos Pliatsidis

    (University of Macedonia)

Abstract

This study uses network theory to analyze the structure and concentration of the Greek public procurement market, focusing on the relationships between Contracting Authorities (CAs) and Economic Operators (EOs) within different Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) groups. By examining degree distribution curves and identifying dominant economic operators, we gain valuable insights into market dynamics and competition in Greece. The findings reveal the presence of market concentration, where a few EOs receive a disproportionate share of contracts within certain CPV groups which suggests potential market dominance and lack of competition. In contrast, some CPV groups demonstrate a more balanced distribution of contracts among EOs, suggesting a healthier competitive environment. The analysis of degree distributions between sub-networks based on CPV groups indicates variations in market structures between sectors. These differences highlight the heterogeneity in the Greek public procurement market, as well as the need for sector-specific policy interventions. Given that the concentration of contract awards raises competition, fairness and transparency concerns, the implications of the findings are important for policymakers, regulators and stakeholders involved in the Greek public procurement market. While this study provides valuable information, limitations including variations in data availability and potential inaccuracies in recorded information exist. Future research should address these limitations and explore the effects of market concentration on CPV codes in greater depth. This study contributes to the public procurement literature and serves as a basis for further research and policy making in the Greek procurement sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Christos Pliatsidis, 2024. "Analyzing concentration in the Greek public procurement market: a network theory approach," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 51(2), pages 431-480, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:epolin:v:51:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s40812-023-00291-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s40812-023-00291-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public procurement; Market concentration; Network analysis; CPV codes; Greece;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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