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The Subgame-Consistent Shapley Value for Dynamic Network Games with Shock

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  • Leon Petrosyan

    (Saint Petersburg State University)

  • Artem Sedakov

    (Saint Petersburg State University)

Abstract

In the paper, cooperative repeated network games containing network formation stages are studied. After the first network formation stage, a particular player with a given probability may stop influencing other players by removing all her links and receiving zero payoffs. This effect is called “shock.” The effect of shock may appear only once, and the stage number, at which shock appears, is chosen at random. In the cooperative scenario of the game, subgame consistency of the Shapley value, based on a characteristic function, which is constructed in a special way, is investigated. To prevent players from breaking the cooperative agreement, a mechanism of stage payments—so-called imputation distribution procedure—is designed.

Suggested Citation

  • Leon Petrosyan & Artem Sedakov, 2016. "The Subgame-Consistent Shapley Value for Dynamic Network Games with Shock," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 520-537, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:6:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-015-0166-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-015-0166-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Parilina, Elena M. & Zaccour, Georges, 2022. "Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).

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