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The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements

  • Bruno Nkuiya

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    This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. At the initial date, numerical simulations reveal that as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the incentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13235-012-0056-5
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Dynamic Games and Applications.

    Volume (Year): 2 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 411-430

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:2:y:2012:i:4:p:411-430
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    1. Bruno Nkuiya & Walid Marrouch & Eric Bahel, 2011. "International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty," Working Papers e07-32, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    4. Santiago Rubio & BegoƱa Casino, 2005. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 89-109, 06.
    5. Rubio, S. J. & Ulph, A., 2002. "An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0210, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    6. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
    7. Alistair Ulph, 2004. "Stable International Environmental Agreements with a Stock Pollutant, Uncertainty and Learning," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 53-73, 07.
    8. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-73, February.
    9. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
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