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Wpływ prawnej ochrony zatrudnienia na rynek pracy w warunkach negatywnego szoku ekonomicznego

Author

Listed:
  • Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski
  • Przemysław Włodarczyk

Abstract

Przedmiotem artykułu jest prawna ochrona zatrudnienia i jej wpływ na rynek pracy, zwłaszcza na zatrudnienie i bezrobocie. Celem rozważań jest określenie istoty i zakresu prawnej ochrony zatrudnienia, ustalenie teoretycznych mechanizmów wpływu tej instytucji na sytuację na rynku pracy oraz próba weryfikacji empirycznej wpływu prawnej ochrony zatrudnienia na rynek pracy krajów OECD. Prawna ochrona zatrudnienia, oznaczająca zestaw norm i procedur regulujących zwalnianie z pracy pracowników, jest instytucją wywierającą wpływ na kształtowanie się zatrudnienia, bezrobocia i płac. Jej wpływ na sytuację na rynku pracy dokonuje się za pośrednictwem dwóch mechanizmów: bezpośredniego osłabienia wahań zatrudnienia i bezrobocia oraz mechanizmu spadających zysków osłabiających popyt na pracę, co skłania do wysunięcia hipotezy o U-kształtnej zależności pomiędzy poziomem ochrony zatrudnienia a zatrudnieniem (bezrobociem). Podjęto próbę empirycznej weryfikacji wysuniętej hipotezy o wpływie prawnej ochrony zatrudnienia na sytuację na rynku pracy, w warunkach wystąpienia negatywnego szoku ekonomicznego, w oparciu o dane dla 26 krajów OECD z lat 2008-2011. Uzyskane wyniki wskazują, iż uzasadnione jest oczekiwanie w okresie kryzysu większych spadków zatrudnienia (i wzrostów bezrobocia) w krajach, w których regulacje prawnej ochrony zatrudnienia są stosunkowo słabe i stosunkowo silne. Najmniejszych spadków zatrudnienia (i wzrostów bezrobocia) w okresie kryzysu możemy się natomiast spodziewać w krajach o poziomie EPL bliskim 2.

Suggested Citation

  • Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski & Przemysław Włodarczyk, 2012. "Wpływ prawnej ochrony zatrudnienia na rynek pracy w warunkach negatywnego szoku ekonomicznego," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 11-12, pages 1-23.
  • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2012:i:11-12:p:1-23
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    prawna ochrona zatrudnienia; instytucje rynku pracy; zatrudnienie; bezrobocie;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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