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Camouflage: A dominant reaction to worsening conditions

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  • Bruno S Frey

Abstract

Individuals choose camouflage as a dominant response when a state’s political conditions worsen, particularly when a democracy turns authoritarian. Individuals hide their private preferences to survive under oppressive regimes. This paper argues that in many circumstances camouflage is the most rational, cost-minimizing reaction to oppression. The paper identifies five kinds of costs that induce individuals to resort to four different ideal types of camouflage: (1) avoidance of contact, (2) minimal participation, (3) restricted cooperation, and (4) full engagement with the oppressive regime. Camouflage is particularly advantageous as the costs of exit or voice are often high. Therefore, a large majority of citizens disagreeing with the ideology and policies of a regime are likely to camouflage.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S Frey, 2023. "Camouflage: A dominant reaction to worsening conditions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 35(3), pages 366-384, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:35:y:2023:i:3:p:366-384
    DOI: 10.1177/10434631231157588
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    References listed on IDEAS

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