Fiscal Institutions and the Relation between Central and Sub-National Government Fiscal Balances
Skeptics of fiscal decentralization argue that it can complicate fiscal stabilization policies at the level of the central government because of uncoordinated fiscal actions by the national and sub-national tiers of government. However, panel data estimates for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development economies suggest that this danger has been overstated in that changes in the fiscal balances of central and sub-national governments are highly positively correlated. This result partly reflects the success of institutional arrangements that govern intergovernmental fiscal relations and appears unrelated to the extent of fiscal decentralization.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:36:y:2008:i:2:p:243-254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publishing)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.