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Do Tobacco-Control Programs Lower Tobacco Consumption?

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  • Michael L. Marlow

    (California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo)

Abstract

California is often considered the model for tobacco-control programs due to its early adoption of comprehensive programs aimed at lowering tobacco consumption. Tobacco control began when voters approved the California Tobacco Tax and Health Promotion Act of 1988. More than $2 billion has been spent on tobacco-control in California since 1988. The findings of this article indicate that tobacco-control spending is a significant factor for the widening gap between consumption in the United States and in California only in equations that exclude cigarette prices and smoking bans as control variables. When significant, however, estimates suggest that, for every $1 increase in tobacco-control spending per capita, the sales gap widens by only 0.11 to 0.18 cigarette packs per capita, or roughly 2 to 4 cigarettes per capita. This study suggests that future research should address the complexity of interactions among tobacco-control programs, cigarette prices, and smoking bans.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael L. Marlow, 2007. "Do Tobacco-Control Programs Lower Tobacco Consumption?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 35(6), pages 689-709, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:35:y:2007:i:6:p:689-709
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael T. Owyang & E. Katarina Vermann, 2012. "Where there’s a smoking ban, there’s still fire," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue July, pages 265-286.
    2. W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, 2010. "Tobacco Regulation through Litigation: The Master Settlement Agreement," NBER Chapters,in: Regulation vs. Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law, pages 71-101 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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