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Can Indian Independent Directors Ever be Independent?

Author

Listed:
  • Rajat Deb
  • Devi Baruah

Abstract

The current study has attempted to assess whether the Indian independent directors are, in a true sense, independent. Extant Corporate Governance literature has postulated that independent directors protect non-controlling minority shareholders, and defend their interests by lending their expertise to strategy. In practice, they seldom reject any strategy proposed by the executive directors who represent the dominant shareholders’ viewpoints. Thus, the independent directors perform advisory roles rather than supervisory roles. The study has assayed that independent directors must cease being subservient to the executive directors and has concluded that mere regulatory changes are insufficient; motivational changes must also accrue to the cause. JEL Classifications: G34, G38

Suggested Citation

  • Rajat Deb & Devi Baruah, 2022. "Can Indian Independent Directors Ever be Independent?," Management and Labour Studies, XLRI Jamshedpur, School of Business Management & Human Resources, vol. 47(4), pages 525-536, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:manlab:v:47:y:2022:i:4:p:525-536
    DOI: 10.1177/0258042X221099430
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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