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Political correctness and elite prestige

Author

Listed:
  • Esther Hauk

    (Institut d'Anà lisi Econòmica (IAE-CSIC), 90214Move and Barcelona School of Economics, Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain)

  • Javier Ortega

    (Department of Economics, 4264Kingston University, London, UK)

Abstract

Consider a society where the prestige of orthodox views is linked to the prestige of the elite. Heterodox individuals are less likely to express their views if other peers refrain from doing so and if the elite is prestigious. In turn, corruption by the elite is less easily detected if orthodox views dominate. We characterize equilibrium self-denial and corruption and show that an exogenous increase in the range of orthodox views may result in a decrease in the total number of individuals truthfully expressing their views. Some features of the model are shown to be compatible with US data.

Suggested Citation

  • Esther Hauk & Javier Ortega, 2025. "Political correctness and elite prestige," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 37(2), pages 122-155, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:37:y:2025:i:2:p:122-155
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298241304713
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patricia Funk, 2016. "How Accurate Are Surveyed Preferences for Public Policies? Evidence from a Unique Institutional Setup," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 442-454, July.
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    3. Stephen Morris, 2001. "Political Correctness," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April.
    4. Kuran, Timur, 1987. "Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 642-665, September.
    5. Leonardo Bursztyn & Georgy Egorov & Stefano Fiorin, 2020. "From Extreme to Mainstream: The Erosion of Social Norms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(11), pages 3522-3548, November.
    6. Michaeli, Moti & Spiro, Daniel, 2015. "Norm conformity across societies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 51-65.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conformity; Overton window; political correctness; preference falsification; social pressure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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