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Political correctness and elite prestige

Author

Listed:
  • Esther Hauk

    (Institut d'Anà lisi Econòmica (IAE-CSIC), 90214Move and Barcelona School of Economics, Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain)

  • Javier Ortega

    (Department of Economics, 4264Kingston University, London, UK)

Abstract

Consider a society where the prestige of orthodox views is linked to the prestige of the elite. Heterodox individuals are less likely to express their views if other peers refrain from doing so and if the elite is prestigious. In turn, corruption by the elite is less easily detected if orthodox views dominate. We characterize equilibrium self-denial and corruption and show that an exogenous increase in the range of orthodox views may result in a decrease in the total number of individuals truthfully expressing their views. Some features of the model are shown to be compatible with US data.

Suggested Citation

  • Esther Hauk & Javier Ortega, 2025. "Political correctness and elite prestige," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 37(2), pages 122-155, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:37:y:2025:i:2:p:122-155
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298241304713
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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