Delegation in a Cheap-Talk Game: A Voting Example
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More about this item
KeywordsDelegation; cheap-talk games; median voter; Bayesian updating;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2004-10-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2004-10-30 (Positive Political Economics)
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