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Formal models in normative political theory

Author

Listed:
  • Hun Chung

    (Department of Quantitative Theory and Methods, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
    Faculty of Political Science and Economics, 13148Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan)

  • Brian Kogelmann

    (Department of Philosophy and Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA)

Abstract

This article revisits the conventional distinction in political science between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and they can provide insights into the practical workings of novel institutional arrangements in the absence of empirical data. The integration of formal models into normative political theory presents challenges, including the development of criteria for evaluating these models and potential shifts in research focus. Integration can also strengthen political theory’s tenuous role in the political science discipline.

Suggested Citation

  • Hun Chung & Brian Kogelmann, 2024. "Formal models in normative political theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(3), pages 256-274, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:36:y:2024:i:3:p:256-274
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298241266267
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    References listed on IDEAS

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