Enough and as Good: a Formal Model of Lockean First Appropriation
In developing a theory of the first appropriation of natural resources from the state of nature John Locke tells us that persons must leave enough and as good for others. Detailing exactly what this restriction requires divides right and left libertarians.Briefly, right libertarians interpret enough and as good as requiring no or very minimal restrictions on the first appropriation of natural resources, whereas left libertarians interpret enough and as good as requiring everyone be entitled to an equal share of unappropriated resources, able to claim no more beyond this equal share. This paper approaches the right versus left libertarian debate by developing a formal model that examines the welfare properties of different interpretations of the Lockean proviso. The model shows that underlying philosophical justifications for left libertarianism, when plausible assumptions hold, will be better served by a right libertarian proviso rather than a left libertarian one.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2017|
|Publication status:||Published by:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Av. F.D., Roosevelt, 39, 1050 Bruxelles|
Phone: (32 2) 650 30 75
Fax: (32 2) 650 44 75
Web page: http://difusion.ulb.ac.be
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, April.
- Vanderschraaf, Peter, 2006. "War Or Peace?: A Dynamical Analysis Of Anarchy," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(02), pages 243-279, July.
- Moller, Dan, 2017. "Property And The Creation Of Value," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(01), pages 1-23, March.
- Moehler, Michael, 2009. "Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game," Utilitas, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(03), pages 297-326, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/249914. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Pauwels)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.