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Domination and democratic legislation

Author

Listed:
  • Sean Ingham

    (Department of Political Science, University of California San Diego)

  • Frank Lovett

    (Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis)

Abstract

Republicans hold that people are unfree if they are dominated, that is, if others have an insufficiently constrained ability to frustrate their choices. Since legislation can frustrate individuals’ choices, republicans believe that the design of legislative institutions has consequences for individual freedom. Some have argued that if legislative institutions are democratic, then they need not be sources of domination at all. We argue this view is incorrect: the introduction of legislative authority, even if democratically organized, always creates a new site of domination. However, republicans can defend democratic procedures as the best means of minimizing the degree to which citizens are dominated, subject to the constraint of equalizing everyone’s freedom. We formulate and prove this claim within a simple model of legislative authority and domination.

Suggested Citation

  • Sean Ingham & Frank Lovett, 2022. "Domination and democratic legislation," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 21(2), pages 97-121, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:21:y:2022:i:2:p:97-121
    DOI: 10.1177/1470594X211072272
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sean Ingham & Frank Lovett, 2019. "Republican Freedom, Popular Control, and Collective Action," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(4), pages 774-787, October.
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