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Arguments-Based Collective Choice

Author

Listed:
  • John W. Patty

    (Harvard University, jwpatty@gmail.com)

Abstract

This article presents a model of collective choice when group decisions must be justified by arguments from first principles. Individuals may have preferences over both the actions chosen and the arguments used to justify them. Defining a notion of stability in the arguments made and actions supported within a group, I characterize the set of actions that can be justified as well as the arguments that will be used to justify these actions. Of particular interest in the article is the fact that each individual's preferences over different arguments are endogenously determined by the collection of actions justified by the arguments.

Suggested Citation

  • John W. Patty, 2008. "Arguments-Based Collective Choice," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 379-414, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:20:y:2008:i:4:p:379-414
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629808093773
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Feddersen, Timothy J. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1999. "Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(2), pages 381-398, June.
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    3. Diana Richards & Brendan D. McKay & Whitman A. Richards, 1998. "Collective Choice and Mutual Knowledge Structures," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(02n03), pages 221-236.
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    5. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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    7. Aragones, Enriqueta & Gilboa, Itzhak & Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 2014. "Rhetoric and analogies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-10.
    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:64:y:1970:i:02:p:426-448_12 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:1:p:25-42_1 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Diana Richards & Whitman A. Richards & Brendan D. McKay, 1998. "Collective Choice and Mutual Knowledge Structures," Research in Economics 98-04-032e, Santa Fe Institute.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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