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Understanding the puzzling resilience of the land share ownership in Russia: the input of Ostrom’s approach

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  • Grouiez, Pascal

Abstract

This paper determines how the rule-in-use on access to agricultural land affects both the size of Russian farms and the nature of land property via enforcement mechanisms. The concept of “institutional arrangements”, developed by Ostrom, is used to show that land use practices by farmers can be considered a compromise between legal land access regimes and economic and social interests of nested communities. This compromise leads to the preservation of both large-scale agricultural production units and “land-share ownership” in Orel.

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  • Grouiez, Pascal, 2013. "Understanding the puzzling resilience of the land share ownership in Russia: the input of Ostrom’s approach," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
    • Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2014:10496
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    1. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 249-262.
    2. Stephen K. Wegren, 2002. "Rural orientations to land privatization in Russia," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(7), pages 1033-1043.
    3. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, 2002. "The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(3), pages 317-330.
    4. Ostrom, Elinor, 2009. "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 89-110, December.
    5. Vasilii Uzun, 2005. "Large and Small Business in Russian Agriculture: Adaptation to Market," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 47(1), pages 85-100, March.
    6. Epstein, David, 2002. "Land privatization in Russia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 185-190, June.
    7. Dmitri Rylko & Robert W Jolly, 2005. "Russia's New Agricultural Operators: Their Emergence, Growth and Impact," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 47(1), pages 115-126, March.
    8. Csaki, Csaba & Lerman, Zvi, 1994. "Land Reform and Farm Sector Restructuring in the Former Socialist Countries in Europe," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 21(3-4), pages 553-576.
    9. Wegren, Stephen K., 2002. "Rural land privatization in Russia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 175-178, June.
    10. Wandel, Jurgen, 2007. "Integrated Structures, Market Forces and Competition in Russia's Agro-Food Sector: An Assessment from the Perspective of the Austrian School of Economics," 102nd Seminar, May 17-18, 2007, Moscow, Russia 10019, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    11. Pascal Grouiez, 2014. "Farming strategies regarding "social responsibility" in the Russian agricultural sector," Post-Print halshs-01064450, HAL.
    12. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911.
    13. Ostrom, Elinor & Basurto, Xavier, 2011. "Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(3), pages 317-343, September.
    14. Rylko, Dmitri & Jolly, Robert W., 2005. "Russia's New Agricultural Operators: Their Emergence, Growth and Impact," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12635, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    15. -, 1986. "Agenda = Agenda," Series Históricas 8749, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
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    Cited by:

    1. Pascal Grouiez & Petia Koleva, 2018. "Transforming the Diary Sector in Post-Communist Economies : actors and strategies," Post-Print hal-02615864, HAL.
    2. Pascal Grouiez, 2014. "Farming strategies regarding "social responsibility" in the Russian agricultural sector," Post-Print halshs-01064450, HAL.
    3. Chanteau, Jean-Pierre & Coriat, Benjamin & Labrousse, Agnès & Orsi, Fabienne, 2013. "Introduction," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
    4. Burak Gürel, 2019. "Semi-private Landownership and Capitalist Agriculture in Contemporary China," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 51(4), pages 650-669, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    régime foncier agricole russe; propriété foncière collective; nouveaux investisseurs; grandes exploitations agricoles; arrangements institutionnels; mécanismes assurant l’exécution des règles; Russian land tenure regime; collective land property; new investors; large-scale agricultural production units; institutional arrangements; enforcement mechanisms; régimen de la tierra agrícola rusa; propiedad rural colectiva; nuevos inversores; grandes explotaciones agrícolas; arreglos institucionales; mecanismos que aseguran la ejecución de las reglas;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P32 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Collectives; Communes; Agricultural Institutions
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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