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Structural Dynamic Of The Public Sector And Multilevel Governance: Between Hierarchies, Market And Network Forms

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  • Lumini?a Gabriela POPESCU

    (National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest)

Abstract

In the current economic, social and political context, the problem of the competitiveness reform in public sector lies in the assumption of strategic approaches focused on meeting the public interest, with the lowest cost for society. The philosophy management which governs public sector reform tends to create new paradigms and contributes to shaping a new way of thinking and behavior. Central idea of this paper is that the two dominant models of administration: bureaucracy and governance, provides a range of institutional opportunities but also raises a number of barriers to strategic approaches to emerging public sector. Bureaucracy is for example, criticized because the lack of prioritization skills and lack of goals and also because lacks to stimulate innovation in the public sector. Bureaucracy leads to uniformity, flattening of public services. Governance model contains a number of similarities with the strategic approach in the public sector, when we talk about networks, interdependence and self-organizing nature of public administration. The issue that we are trying reveal to your attention is that the current institutional conditions are more complex than two models mentioned are able to cover. These new demands require the types of organizational structures based on flexible, decentralized structure to replace the traditional centralized, which now is totally inapplicable. Institutional framework may, for example, to provide an opportunity for the New Public Management, but also create a barrier to governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Lumini?a Gabriela POPESCU, 2011. "Structural Dynamic Of The Public Sector And Multilevel Governance: Between Hierarchies, Market And Network Forms," REVISTA ADMINISTRATIE SI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC, Faculty of Administration and Public Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2011(17), pages 47-63, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:rom:rampas:v:2011:y:2011:i:17:p:47-63
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bureaucracy; governance; public policy; networks; multilevel governance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • R1 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics

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