Riesgo moral y contratos: cierta evidencia experimental
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- Julián Arévalo & Jair Ojeda, 2004. "Riesgo Moral y Contratos: Cierta Evidencia Experimental," Game Theory and Information 0407002, EconWPA, revised 18 Jul 2004.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsmoral risk; contracts; experimental evidence; asymmetric information;
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
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