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Riesgo Moral y Contratos: Cierta Evidencia Experimental

Author

Listed:
  • Julián Arévalo

    (Universidad Externado de Colombia)

  • Jair Ojeda

    (Banco de la República)

Abstract

This paper shows one type of asymetric information problems, their theorethical implications, the design of contracts that mitigate them, as well as some experimental evidence. Furthermore, by extrapolating the results, the paper tries to illustrate certain macroeconomic implications obtained under a controlled environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Julián Arévalo & Jair Ojeda, 2004. "Riesgo Moral y Contratos: Cierta Evidencia Experimental," Game Theory and Information 0407002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Jul 2004.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0407002
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0407/0407002.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ochs, Jack & Roth, Alvin E, 1989. "An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 355-384, June.
    2. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
    3. Hoffman, Elizabeth & Spitzer, Matthew L, 1982. "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 73-98, April.
    4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-980, July.
    5. Caballero, Ricardo J & Engel, Eduardo M R A & Haltiwanger, John, 1997. "Aggregate Employment Dynamics: Building from Microeconomic Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 115-137, March.
    6. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral Hazard; Contracts; Experimental Economics; Assymetric Information;

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other

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