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Impact of income-detection technology and other factors on aggregate income tax evasion:the case of the United States

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  • Richard J. Cebula

    () (Armstrong Atlantic State University, Economics Department, Savannah (USA))

Abstract

This study empirically investigates the impact of improving income-detectiontechnology, as well as a variety of other factors, on aggregate income taxevasion. The study focuses on the U.S., using available data for the 1975-97 period. The empirical findings indicate that improving income-detection technology appears to have significantly reduced the degree of aggregate income-tax evasion in theU.S. over time. In addition, the estimates indicate that federal income tax evasionappears to be an increasing function not only of the federal personal income tax rate but also of the public's dissatisfaction with government. Furthermore, income taxevasion appears to be a decreasing function both of penalties imposed by the IRS on unpaid taxes and IRS audit rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard J. Cebula, 2001. "Impact of income-detection technology and other factors on aggregate income tax evasion:the case of the United States," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(219), pages 401-415.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:2001:44
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011. "Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 489-500, January.
    2. Cebula, Richard J. & Coombs, Christopher & Yang, Bill Z., 2009. "The Tax Reform Act of 1986: An Assessment in Terms of Tax Compliance Behavior," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 62(2), pages 145-162.
    3. Richard J. Cebula & Maggie Foley, 2014. "Teaching the economics of income tax evasion," Chapters,in: New Developments in Economic Education, chapter 12, pages 133-139 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Cebula, Richard & Toma, Michael, 2004. "Do Budget Deficits Reduce Household Taxpayer Compliance? Preliminary Evidence Using the Feige Data," MPRA Paper 56739, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Cebula, Richard, 2010. "An Empirical Analysis of Determinants of Recent Federal Personal Income Tax Evasion in the U.S," MPRA Paper 53205, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Richard J. Cebula, 2014. "The underground economy in the U.S.A.: preliminary new evidence on the impact of income tax rates (and other factors) on aggregate tax evasion 1975-2008," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 67(271), pages 451-481.
    7. Cebula, Richard J., 2011. "Aggregate Income Tax Evasion: Empirical Results Using new IRS Data for the U.S. - L’evasione aggregata del reddito: risultati empirici ottenuti utilizzando i nuovi dati IRS per gli USA," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 64(4), pages 423-443.
    8. Franklin G. Mixon & Richard J. Cebula (ed.), 2014. "New Developments in Economic Education," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15538.
    9. Bayer, Ralph-C & Sutter, Matthias, 2009. "The excess burden of tax evasion--An experimental detection-concealment contest," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(5), pages 527-543, July.
    10. Richard J. Cebula, 2014. "Where Has The Currency Gone? And Why? The Underground Economy And Personal Income Tax Evasion In The U.S., 1970-2008," Review of Economic Analysis, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, vol. 6(1), pages 36-52, June.
    11. Feige, Edgar L. & Cebula, Richard, 2011. "America’s Underground Economy: Measuring the Size, Growth and Determinants of Income Tax Evasion in the U.S," MPRA Paper 29672, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evasion; Income Tax Evasion; Income Tax; Tax Evasion; Tax;

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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