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Politique de l'effet de serre. Une évaluation du plan français de quotas de CO2

Listed author(s):
  • Olivier Godard

[eng] Climate Policy. An Assessment of the French Plan of CO2 Quotas. Having in view the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol [1997] limiting greenhouse gas emissions, European Authorities decided to set up a European market of CO2 emission quotas for big emitters of industrial and energy sectors. This market is supposed to be operational since January 2005. Meanwhile, each member state, not the Commission, had to choose the level of the national emissions ceiling for this instrument, the list of plants that will be concerned and the rules for allocating quotas to existing and new facilities. The paper presents an assessment of the French final plan, as accepted in December 2004 by the European Commission after several adjustments of the initial plan. It considers both overall quantities affected and impacts of rules of the game on incentives given to business. As a result, choices made by the French government express a will to protect national industry and energy producers rather than to set appropriate economic incentives for an efficient and strong system in line with Kyoto commitments. [fre] Olivier Godard Politique de l'effet de serre. Une évaluation du plan français de quotas de CO2. En vue d'une application du protocole de Kyoto [1997] sur les émissions de gaz à effet de serre, les autorités européennes ont décidé d'organiser un marché européen de quotas d'émission de CO2 pour le secteur de l'énergie et les secteurs industriels gros émetteurs. Toutefois chaque Etat-membre devait définir les variables principales : plafond total d'émissions attribué au dispositif; périmètre des installations soumises ; règles d'affectation de quotas aux installations existantes et nouvelles. Ce marché est théoriquement opérationnel depuis janvier 2005. L'article évalue le plan arrêté par le gouvernement français et accepté, après plusieurs ajustements, par la Commission européenne en décembre 2004. Il discute des quantités allouées et de l'incidence des règles choisies sur les incitations données aux acteurs économiques. Il montre que les autorités françaises se sont davantage souciées de mettre à l'abri l'industrie nationale que de mettre en place un outil économique incitatif en ligne avec les engagements de Kyoto et bien conçu pour être économiquement performant.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 19 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 147-186

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2005_num_19_4_1563
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2005.1563
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  1. Robert W. Hahn, 1984. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(4), pages 753-765.
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