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Les contrats de crédit dans une relation de long terme. De la main invisible à la poignée de main

  • Dorothée Rivaud-Danset
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    [fre] Les incertitudes sur l'issue de la relation de crédit de clientèle ont une double origine : la banque cherche à s'assurer que son client pourra la rembourser, l'emprunteur souhaite obtenir des assurances sur les conditions d'accès au crédit dans le futur. De la littérature théorique se dégagent deux principes de coordina­tion optimale entre prêteur et emprunteur dans le long terme : (1) le contrat incitatif inspiré de la théorie de l'agence ; (2) le contrat implicite qui fournit une assurance mutuelle (réduction de l'asymétrie d'information pour le prêteur et traitement privi­légié de l'emprunteur). Sont discutées la nécessité et la crédibilité de la confiance. La conclusion s'interroge sur l'intégration de principes extérieurs aux contractants, tels que la justice et la réputation. [eng] Uncertainties on the outcome of a customer credit relation have two origins : the bank wants to get insurance that its customer will be able to reimburse, the borrower hopes to get insurance on its ability to lend in the future. From the theo­retical literature come out two distinct issues on the optimal way to coordinate bor­rower and lender in the long term : (1) the incentive contract built from the theory of agence to complete the « invisible hand » ; (2) the implicit contract with mutual gains. Then we deal with trust. Necessity and credibility of trust are discussed. As a conclusion we show how these theoretical works deal with the problems of social constituents, like justice or reputation.

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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

    Volume (Year): 47 (1996)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 937-962

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_4_409829
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409829
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    1. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-62, August.
    2. Ben S. Bernanke, 1983. "Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 1054, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Bull, Clive, 1983. "Implicit Contracts in the Absence of Enforcement and Risk Aversion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 658-71, September.
    4. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
    5. Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, 1994. "Financial Decision-Making in Markets and Firms: A Behavioral Perspective," NBER Working Papers 4777, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Cable, John R, 1985. "Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West German Banks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(377), pages 118-32, March.
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