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Modèles du SME : l'Europe n'est-elle qu'une zone deutsche mark ?

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  • Francesco Giavazzi
  • Alberto Giovannini

Abstract

[eng] Models of the ems: is Europe a greater deutschmark area ?. . Regimes of fixed exchange rates or limited exchange-rate flexibility, like the ideal « target zone » proposai or the real European Monetary System (EMS), raise the question of symmetry. Who runs monetary policy and who sets exchange-rate parities ? If exchange rates are determined exogenously by a mechanical rule, does — or should — only one country run monetary policy, or does this depend on all members of the System ?. This paper tries to answer these questions with special attention to the experience of the EMS. Our interpretation of the data is that the EMS reproduces the historical examples of fixed exchange-rate regimes. Germany is the centre country and runs monetary policy for the whole System. When the other countries are unable or unwilling to go along with Germany's monetary targets, they change their exchange rate. Capital controls allow them to gain limited independence from the burden of adjustment to international shocks. A combination of foreign exchange intervention policies and domestic sterilisation appears to free Germany from the burden of adjustment to intra-European portfolio shocks. The important implication of our results is that analyses of fixed or managed exchange rate regimes should explicitly address the effects of this asymmetry. [fre] Modèles du SME : l'Europe n'est-elle qu'une zone deutsche mark ?. . Les régimes à taux de change fixes ou à flexibilité limitée des taux de change, tels que le système des « zones de cibles » proposé pour le Système monétaire international ou le Système monétaire européen (SME) actuel, soulèvent le problème de la symétrie entre les pays membres. Qui décide de la politique monétaire et qui détermine les parités des taux de change ? Dans le cas où les taux de change sont déterminés exogènement suivant une règle mécanique, la politique monétaire est-elle, ou devrait-elle être, mise en œuvre par un seul pays ou par tous les pays membres du système ?. Le présent article essaie de répondre à ces questions, en prêtant une attention particulière à l'expérience du SME. Notre interprétation des données est que le SME reproduit les exemples historiques de régimes à taux de changes fixes. L'Allemagne est le pays pivot, et mène la politique monétaire pour tout le système. Lorsque les autres pays sont incapables de suivre les objectifs monétaires de l'Allemagne, ou ne veulent pas s'adapter aux contraintes qu'ils impliquent, ils modifient leur taux de change. Grâce aux contrôles des mouvements de capitaux, ils peuvent jouir d'une indépendance limitée, par rapport aux contraintes imposées par la conjoncture internationale. Une combinaison de politiques d'intervention sur les marchés des changes et de stérilisation des capitaux intérieurs apparaît susceptible de libérer l'Allemagne du poids de l'ajustement aux perturbations intervenant sur les marchés de titres intra-européens. Nos résultats ont des implications importantes, à savoir que les analyses de régimes à taux de change fixes ou gérés devraient s'attaquer explicitement aux effets de cette asymétrie.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Giavazzi & Alberto Giovannini, 1988. "Modèles du SME : l'Europe n'est-elle qu'une zone deutsche mark ?," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 39(3), pages 641-666.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1988_num_39_3_409088
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1988.409088
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1988.409088
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    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1828 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Catherine Mathieu & Henri Sterdyniak, 1989. "Vers une monnaie commune en Europe ?," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 26(1), pages 95-126.

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