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Histoire de la compensation: de la monnaie aux titres

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  • Catherine Karyotis

Abstract

[fre] La compensation consiste en un échange, entre intermédiaires financiers, de dettes réciproques. Sur un marché réglementé, elle s’effectue par le biais d’une chambre qui s’interpose entre les deux contreparties. Elle s’est d’abord développée pour les créances bancaires puis s’est étendue aux titres, tout en étant une condition de développement des marchés dérivés. La compensation des créances bancaires gérée par un organisme centralisé est apparue dès le XVIe siècle en Italie et s’est généralisée en Écosse. Au XIXe siècle, les États-Unis l’ont expérimenté dans le système Suffolk, ce qui les a amenés ensuite à créer leur Banque centrale. Parallèlement, les marchés dérivés américains se sont développés rapidement avec des chambres de compensation. Sur les marchés de titres, le compte courant de titres, instrument de la compensation, a commencé à se généraliser en Allemagne et en France au cours des XIXe et XXe siècles. Aujourd’hui, la compensation est une fonction de base de tout marché - monétaire, financier et dérivé. Elle permet de réduire les coûts de traitement des négociations mais également les risques. Enfin, les autorités de tutelle préconisent souvent une chambre de compensation commune à plusieurs marchés et places financières pour optimiser la gestion des prises de garantie et mutualiser les risques. . Classification JEL : F02, N20 [eng] History of the clearing : from currency to securities . The netting consists of an exchange, between financial agents, of reciprocal debts. On a regulated market, it is carried out by the means of a clearinghouse which interposes between the two jobbers. It initially developed for the banking credits then extended to the securities, while being a condition of development of the future markets. The clearing of the banking credits managed by a centralized organization appeared as of sixteenth century in Italy and spread in Scotland. The United States, at the nineteenth century, tried out it in the Suffolk system which then led them to create their central bank. In parallel, the American futures markets developed quickly with clearing houses. On the stock exchanges, the current account of securities, instrument of the compensation, appeared only gradually to spread in Germany and France during nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Today, the clearing is a basic function of all markets - monetary, financial and futures. It makes it possible to reduce not only the costs of treatment of the deals but also the risks. Finally the official authorities often recommend a clearing house common to several markets to optimize the management of the guarantees and to share the risks. . Classification JEL : F02, N20

Suggested Citation

  • Catherine Karyotis, 2008. "Histoire de la compensation: de la monnaie aux titres," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 91(1), pages 77-95.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2008_num_91_1_5058
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2008.5058
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2008.5058
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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