IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Les dilemmes du prêteur en dernier ressort international

  • Michel Aglietta
  • Caroline Denise
Registered author(s):

    [fre] L'objet de cet article est de tenter de clarifier le concept de prêteur en dernier ressort international. Alors que la question au niveau national semblait avoir fait l'objet d'un consensus, son analyse au niveau international pose de redoutables problèmes, tant théoriques qu'opérationnels. Les tentatives de réforme qui ont suivi le déchaînement des crises des derniers mois reflètent cette indécision sur ce que doit être un prêteur en dernier ressort international dans l'état actuel des choses et sur les éléments qui fondent sa légitimité. Après avoir rappelé les fondements théoriques et les critères de légitimité du prêteur en dernier ressort, nous analysons les conditions dans lesquelles une intervention internationale est nécessaire et les modalités d'organisation envisageables. Deux modèles cohérents, présentant une vision globale, émergent de l'ensemble des propositions : l'un fondé sur les règles transforme le prêteur en dernier ressort international en méta-régulateur, l'autre fondé sur l'ambiguïté constructive met en réseaux les banques centrales. [eng] This article endeavours to clarify the notion of an International Lender of Last Resort. While this question has reached a workable consensus at the national level, its extension to the international arena raises serious difficulties, both theoretically and practically. The minimal reforms that have been adopted in the aftermath of the Asian crisis reflect this uncertainty over what an International Lender of Last Resort should be and the criteria of its legitimacy. After recalling the theoretical foundations for a Lender of Last Resort, we investigate the conditions in which an international intervention is necessary and the possible frameworks to implement it. Two global consistent models stand out : one relies on the rules that convert the function of Lender of Last Resort into a meta- regulator, the other is based on constructive ambiguity and the establishment of a network of central banks.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

    Volume (Year): 14 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 35-85

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1999_num_14_4_1091
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1999.1091
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1999_num_14_4_1091. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.