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The supply of and demand for financial regulation : public and private competition around the globe : commentary

  • Randall S. Kroszner
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    File URL: http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2000/S00kros.pdf
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    Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in its journal Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole.

    Volume (Year): (2000)
    Issue (Month): ()
    Pages: 137-149

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    Handle: RePEc:fip:fedkpr:y:2000:p:137-149
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    1. Kroszner, Randall S. & Rajan, Raghuram G., 1997. "Organization structure and credibility: Evidence from commercial bank securities activities before the Glass-Steagall Act," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 475-516, August.
    2. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June.
    3. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives Clearing Houses and Recent Over-the Counter Innovations," CRSP working papers 493, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    4. Randall S. Kroszner, 1998. "On the political economy of banking and financial regulatory reform in emerging markets," Proceedings 605, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    5. Pirrong, S.C., 1997. "A Positive Theory of Financial Exchange Organization with Normative Implications for Financial Market Regulation," Washington University 97-06, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University.
    6. T. Santos & J. Scheinkman, 2000. "Competition Among Exchanges," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s12, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    7. Demirguc-Kunt, Asl1 & Huizinga, Harry, 1999. "Market discipline and financial safety net design," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2183, The World Bank.
    8. George Fenn & Paul Kupiec, 1991. "Prudential margin policy in a futures-style settlement system," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 164, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    9. James T. Moser, 1998. "Contracting innovations and the evolution of clearing and settlement methods at futures exchanges," Working Paper Series WP-98-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    10. Federico Sturzenegger & Mariano Tommasi (ed.), 1998. "The Political Economy of Reform," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262194007, June.
    11. Randall Kroszner, 1999. "Can the financial markets privately regulate risk? The development of derivatives clearinghouses and recent over-the-counter innovations," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 596-623.
    12. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521347891 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Kroszner, Randall S, 1999. "Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 596-618, August.
    14. Bernanke, Ben S, 1990. "Clearing and Settlement during the Crash," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 3(1), pages 133-51.
    15. Eli M. Remolona & William Bassett & In Sun Geoum, 1996. "Risk management by structured derivative product companies," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 17-37.
    16. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, 03.
    17. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
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