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Taux de conversion et déstabilisation allemande : retour sur une intégration contrariée

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  • Thierry Cailleau

Abstract

[fre] Partant du constat que cette intégration ne s'est pas déroulée comme prévu par les autorités, l'objet de cet article porte sur la ftxation des modalités de l'union monétaire et ses conséquences. Ne s'est-on pas trompé de taux de conversion ? En étudiant l'adaptabilité des théories de change au cas allemand, nous cherchons à appréhender un taux de conversion d'équilibre entre les deux marks. Ensuite, les contradictions mises en évidence dans la conversion servent à analyser les conséquences des choix effectués. L'adoption d'un taux de déséquilibre a renforcé l'asymétrie des chocs et a amplifié la déstabilisation économique, monétaire et financière. Ainsi, la conversion a induit une perte partielle du contrôle de la politique monétaire de la Bundesbank, un effondrement de l'économie et de l'emploi. Enfin, le devis et le coût réel de l'union peuvent être mis en parallèle. Cette démarche présente l'intérêt de remettre en évidence l'importance des conditions d'intégration, et de rappeler qu'une union est toujours possible, à condition « d'y mettre le prix ». [eng] Conversion rate and German destabilisation : the return on a thwarted integration. Starting from the observation that this integration did not go as expected by the authorities, the objective of this article is the fixing of terms of monetary union and the consequences. Weren't we wrong about the exchange rate ? By studying the adaptability of the exchange rate theories to the case of Germany, we try to understand an equilibrium conversion rate between the two marks. Then, the contradictions outlined in the conversion are used to analyse the consequences of the choices made. The adoption of a disequilibrium rate reinforced the asymmetry of shocks and amplified economic, monetary and financial destabilisation. Thus, the conversion implied a partial loss of control of the monetary policy of the Bundesbank, an economic and employment collapse. Finally, the estimate and the real cost of the union can be compared. This process presents the interest of outlining the importance of integration conditions, and recalling that a union is always possible, as long as we are « prepared to pay the price ».

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Cailleau, 1999. "Taux de conversion et déstabilisation allemande : retour sur une intégration contrariée," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 55(5), pages 69-97.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_1999_num_55_5_4935
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.1999.4935
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Bofinger, 1990. "The German monetary unification (Gmu): converting marks to d-marks," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 17-36.
    2. Bela Balassa, 1964. "The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72, pages 584-584.
    3. Anne Bauer & Sanvi Avouyi-Dovi & Catherine Augory, 1993. "Les effets de la réunification sur les taux d'intérêt allemands," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(5), pages 1001-1026.
    4. Collier, Irwin L, Jr & Siebert, Horst, 1991. "The Economic Integration of Post-Wall Germany," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 196-201, May.
    5. Siebert, Horst, 1991. "German unification: the economics of transition," Kiel Working Papers 468, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    6. Rudiger Dornbusch & Holger Wolf, 1992. "Economic Transition in Eastern Germany," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 23(1), pages 235-272.
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