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Intercommunalité et fiscalité directe locale

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  • Sylvie Charlot
  • Sonia Paty
  • Virginie Piguet

Abstract

[fre] L’intercommunalité représente le principal déterminant de la fi scalité locale pour toutes les taxes de 1993 à 2006. L’appartenance à un établissement public de coopération intercommunale (EPCI) tend à accroître les taux des quatre impôts directs locaux par rapport à une situation hors groupement. Ces taux sont en outre structurellement plus élevés dans les EPCI en taxe professionnelle unique et en fi scalité mixte. Enfi n, de manière globale, ils augmentent également structurellement avec la taille des communes pour ensuite diminuer pour les très grandes villes (plus de 50 000 habitants pour les taxes foncières et la taxe d’habitation et plus de 100 000 habitants pour la taxe professionnelle). Ces résultats sont obtenus sur la base d’une analyse structurelle-résiduelle des niveaux d’imposition des quatre impôts directs locaux dans les communes en fonction de l’appartenance des communes aux différentes catégories de groupements intercommunaux, de leur taille en termes de population, de leur «degré» de ruralité et du type de bassin de vie. Intercommunalité et fi scalité directe locale [eng] The main determinant of all forms of local taxation in France between 1993 and 2006 was the cooperation between municipalities (communes) known as “intercommunality” (intercommunalité). First, a municipality’s membership in a Public Intermunicipal Cooperation Body (Établissement Public de Coopération Intercommunale: EPCI) tends to increase the rates of the four local direct taxes relative to a municipality that does not belong to such a group. Second, the rates are structurally higher in EPCIs that have adopted a single business tax and a supplementary local tax on households (fiscalité mixte). Third, as a rule, local taxation rates tend to rise structurally with municipality size, then decline in the largest cities (over 50,000 inhabitants for property taxes and the occupancy tax [taxe d’habitation], . over 100,000 inhabitants for the local business tax). We obtained these results with a structural-residual analysis of taxation levels for the four local direct taxes in municipalities according to their membership in various categories of intermunicipal groupings, their population size, their “degree” of rurality, and the type of “living area” (bassin de vie) to which they belong. [spa] La intermunicipalidad representa el principal determinante de la fi scalidad local para todos los impuestos de 1993 a 2006. La pertenencia a un establecimiento público de cooperación intermunicipal (EPCI) tiende a aumentar las tasas de los cuatro impuestos directos locales respecto a una situación sin agrupamiento. Además estas tasas son estructuralmente más elevadas en los EPCI con impuesto de actividad profesional único y fi scalidad mixta. Por último, en general, también aumentan estructuralmente con la dimensión de los municipios para disminuir después en las ciudades más grandes (más de 50.000 habitantes para los impuestos de bienes inmuebles y el impuesto sobre la vivienda y más de 100.000 habitantes para el impuesto de actividad profesional). Estos resultados se han obtenido en base a un análisis estructural-residual de los niveles de imposición de los cuatro impuestos directos locales en los municipios en función de la pertenencia de los municipios a las diferentes categorías de agrupamientos intermunicipales, de su tamaño en términos de población, de su “grado” de ruralidad y del tipo de “cuencas de vida”. [ger] Die Interkommunalität ist die wichtigste Determinante für die Festsetzung aller lokalen Steuern in den Jahren von 1993 bis 2006. Die Zugehörigkeit zu einem öffentlichen interkommunalen Zweckverband führt zu einem Anstieg der vier lokalen direkten Steuern im Vergleich zu Kommunen außerhalb eines solchen Zweckverbands. In diesen interkommunalen Zweckverbänden sind diese Steuersätze zudem für die einheitliche Gewerbesteuer und die Mischformen der Steuern strukturell höher. Generell steigen sie auch mit der Größe der Kommunen und sinken in den sehr großen Städten (mit über 50 000 Einwohnern bei der Grundsteuer und Wohnraumsteuer und mit über 100 000 Einwohnern bei der Gewerbesteuer). Diese Ergebnisse erhält man anhand einer strukturellen Grenzwertanalyse der Sätze der vier lokalen direkten Steuern in den Kommunen entsprechend ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu verschiedenen Arten kommunaler Zusammenschlüsse, ihrer Größe bezogen auf die Einwohner, dem Grad ihres ländlichen Charakters und der Lebensweise.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvie Charlot & Sonia Paty & Virginie Piguet, 2008. "Intercommunalité et fiscalité directe locale," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 415(1), pages 121-140.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2008_num_415_1_7023
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.2008.7023
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2008.7023
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    4. Fredrik Andersson & Rikard Forslid, 2003. "Tax Competition and Economic Geography," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 279-303, April.

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