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Resolving of failing financial institutions: from bail-out to bail-in
[Řešení selhávajících finančních institucí aneb od bail-out k bail-in]

Author

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  • Lukáš Fiala

Abstract

The article deals with the issue of TLAC and MREL capital requirements as a tool safeguarding the sufficient level of absorbing and recapitalization capacity of failing banks. The contribution is three-fold. Firstly, the article provides comparative analysis of TLAC and MREL and identify the main differences associated with scope of eligible institutions, eligible instruments subordination requirements and the required limits of the standards. Secondly, we identify main differences resulting from the revision of BRRD with respect to areas mentioned in comparative analysis. Thirdly, the article presents descriptive analysis of the CNB´s approach to calibration of MREL, which is based on TREA and leverage ratio.

Suggested Citation

  • Lukáš Fiala, 2021. "Resolving of failing financial institutions: from bail-out to bail-in [Řešení selhávajících finančních institucí aneb od bail-out k bail-in]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2021(3), pages 21-39.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlcfu:v:2021:y:2021:i:3:id:563:p:21-39
    DOI: 10.18267/j.cfuc.563
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marc Sanchez-Roger & María Dolores Oliver-Alfonso & Carlos Sanchís-Pedregosa, 2018. "Bail-In: A Sustainable Mechanism for Rescuing Banks," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(10), pages 1-18, October.
    2. Mr. Luc Laeven & Mr. Fabian Valencia, 2010. "Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly," IMF Working Papers 2010/146, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Virginia Skidmore Rutledge & Michael Moore & Mr. Marc C Dobler & Wouter Bossu & Nadège Jassaud & Ms. Jianping Zhou, 2012. "From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 2012/003, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Metrick, Andrew, 2019. "European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 1(3), pages 130-149, March.
    5. Mr. Luc Laeven & Mr. Fabian Valencia, 2018. "Systemic Banking Crises Revisited," IMF Working Papers 2018/206, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Lorenzo Pandolfi, 2018. "Bail-in vs. Bailout: a False Dilemma?," CSEF Working Papers 499, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    7. Virginia Skidmore Rutledge & Michael Moore & Marc C Dobler & Wouter Bossu & Nadège Jassaud & Jianping Zhou, 2012. "From Bail-out to Bail-in; Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 12/03, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Andrea Sironi, 2018. "The evolution of banking regulation since the financial crisis: a critical assessment," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 18103, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    9. Metrick, Andrew, 2019. "European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 1(3), pages 113-129, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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