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Rejection or support? research on labor participation strategy of older adults based on three-party evolutionary game

Author

Listed:
  • Yan Shen
  • Yingying Zhong
  • Fei Sun

Abstract

To address the demographic challenges posed by accelerated aging and shrinking labor force, it is crucial to develop human resources and encourage labor participation among older adults to achieve active aging. This study constructs a three-party evolutionary game model involving government departments, local enterprises, and older workers based on evolutionary game theory. It analyses the strategic choices of each party during the gaming process and their evolutionary strategies under different conditions, with numerical simulations conducted to examine the impact of parameter adjustments on these evolutionary dynamics. The findings indicate that: the effectiveness of digital government construction serves as a critical determinant for governmental support of older adults’ labor participation; the probability of enterprises actively employing older workers correlates with both the outcomes of corporate digital transformation and labor costs associated with older adults’ employment; older individuals’ likelihood of labor participation relates to employment income and age discrimination, while digital technology empowerment facilitates strategic shifts from negative to positive engagement for both government and enterprises. Based on these conclusions, policy recommendations including strengthening digital government development, accelerating enterprise digital transformation, and fostering age-friendly employment environments are proposed, thereby providing theoretical foundations for implementing national strategies addressing the labor shortage challenges due to population aging.

Suggested Citation

  • Yan Shen & Yingying Zhong & Fei Sun, 2026. "Rejection or support? research on labor participation strategy of older adults based on three-party evolutionary game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 21(4), pages 1-24, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0346531
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0346531
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
    4. repec:fth:iniesr:487 is not listed on IDEAS
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